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Abstract: It has been widely argued in the literature that security concerns should be integrated with software 
engineering practices. However, only recently work has been initiated towards this direction. Most of this 
work, however, only considers how security can be analysed during the development lifecycles and not how 
the security of an information system can be tested during the analysis and design stages. In this paper we 
present results from the development of a technique, which is based on the use of scenarios, to test the 
reaction of an information system against potential security attacks.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
In previous papers, we have presented a process 
that allows developers to identify the security 
requirements of an information system (Mouratidis, 
2003), reason about a suitable architectural style 
(Mouratidis, 2003a), and successfully transform 
security requirements to design (Mouratidis, 2003b).  
However, an important issue is to test how the 
system under development copes with possible 
attacks. Testing is widely considered an important 
activity that helps to identify errors in a system and 
techniques such as control and data flow testing, 
formal specifications, special testing languages, and 
test tools have been used for many years in testing 
systems, and they are considered valuable solutions 
for many projects. However, most of these 
approaches are difficult to apply, they require 
special training and skills, and they employ their 
own concepts and notations (Ryser, 1999).  
These requirements usually conflict with many of 
the characteristics that a security oriented process 
should demonstrate, such as to be clear and well 
guided, to allow non-security specialists to consider 
security issues in the development process and to 
employ the same concepts and notations throughout 
the development lifecycle of a  software system.  
This paper presents results from the development 
of a scenario-based technique to test how an 
information system under development copes 
against potential security attacks. Section 2 provides 
a brief overview of the Tropos methodology 
necessary for readers non-familiar with the 
methodology. Section 3 discusses our approach by 
describing the Security Attack Scenarios, whereas 
Section 4 illustrates our approach with the aid of an 
example taken from the health care sector. In 
Section 5 we present a discussion of related work 
and Section 6 presents some concluding remarks and 
future work.  
2. THE TROPOS 
METHODOLOGY 
Tropos is a development methodology tailored to 
describe both the organisational environment of a 
system and the system itself.  
 Tropos adopts the i* modelling framework (Yu, 
1995), which uses the concepts of actors, goals, 
tasks, resources and social dependencies for defining 
the obligations of actors (dependees) to other actors 
(dependers). Actors have strategic goals and 
intentions within the system or the organisation and 
represent (social) agents (organisational, human or 
software), roles or positions (represent a set of roles. 
A goal represents the strategic interests of an actor. 
In Tropos we differentiate between hard goals 
(simply called goals hereafter) and soft goals. Soft 
goals represent non-functional requirements and 
have no clear definition or criteria for deciding 
whether they are satisfied or not (Yu, 1995). An 
example of a soft goal is “the system should be 
scalable”. A task represents a way of doing 
something. Thus, for example a task can be executed 
in order to satisfy a goal. A resource represents a 
physical or an informational entity while a 
dependency between two actors indicates that one 
actor depends on another to accomplish a goal, 
execute a task, or deliver a resource.   
Therefore, in Tropos we consider the system as 
an actor, which can be decomposed to sub-actors, 
and we delegate to it goals to be satisfied (functional 
requirements). In order to satisfy such goals we can 
design the system in different ways and these can 
have different affect on the non-functional 
requirements, such as performance, reliability and 
security.  
In previous papers (Mouratidis, 2003 – 
Mouratidis, 2003a – Mouratidis, 2003b), we have 
presented how we extended the Tropos 
methodology, by introducing the concepts of 
security reference diagram and security constraints 
and by redefining existing Tropos concepts such as 
secure entities, secure dependencies, and secure 
capabilities to enable it to consider security aspects 
throughout the whole development process. 
A security diagram (Mouratidis, 2002) 
represents the connection between security features, 
threats, protection objectives, and security 
mechanisms that help towards the satisfaction of the 
objectives. Security features represent security 
related features that the system-to-be must have. 
Protection objectives represent a set of principles 
that contribute towards the achievement of the 
security features. Threats on the other hand represent 
circumstances that have the potential to cause loss or 
problems that can put in danger the security features 
of the system, while security mechanisms identify 
possible protection mechanisms of achieving 
protection objectives. 
A security constraint (Mouratidis, 2002) is 
defined as a constraint that is related to the security 
of the system, whereas secure entities represent any 
secure goals/tasks/resources of the system. Secure 
goals are introduced to the system to help in the 
achievement of a security constraint. A secure goal 
(Mouratidis, 2002) does not particularly define how 
the security constraint can be achieved, since (as in 
the definition of goal) alternatives can be 
considered. However, this is possible through a 
secure task, since a task specifies a way of doing 
something (Yu, 1995). Thus, a secure task 
represents a particular way for satisfying a secure 
goal. For example, for the secure goal Authorise 
Access, we might have secure tasks such as Check 
Password or Check Digital Signatures. A resource 
that is related to a secure entity or a security 
constraint is considered a secure resource. For 
example, an actor depends on another actor to 
receive some information and this dependency 
(resource dependency) is restricted by a constraint 
Only Encrypted Info.  
A secure dependency (Mouratidis, 2003) 
introduces security constraint(s), proposed either by 
the depender or the dependee in order to 
successfully satisfy the dependency. For example a 
Doctor (depender) depends on a Patient (dependee) 
to obtain Health Information (dependum). However, 
the Patient imposes a security constraint to the 
Doctor to share health information only if consent is 
obtained. Both the depender and the dependee must 
agree in this constraint (or constraints) for the secure 
dependency to be valid. That means, in the depender 
side, the depender expects from the dependee to 
satisfy the security constraints while in the dependee 
side, a secure dependency means that the dependee 
will make an effort to deliver the dependum by 
satisfying the security constraint(s).  
A secure capability (Mouratidis, 2003b) 
represents the ability of an actor to achieve a secure 
goal, carry out a secure task and/or deliver a secure 
resource. For example, consider an actor that is 
responsible for providing cryptographic services in 
an information system. This actor should posses 
(amongst other) secure capabilities to decrypt 
incoming data and encrypt outgoing data.  
3. ATTACK SCENARIOS 
The popularity of scenarios have been increased 
among software engineers and are proven to be 
valuable for eliciting information about systems 
requirements, communicating with stakeholders and 
providing context for requirements (Ryser, 2000). 
As a result, scenarios have been applied in many 
different areas of computer science research, such as 
software engineering (Potts, 1994), business-process 
reengineering (Anton, 1994), and user interface 
design (Carroll, 1991). In particular, many cases can 
 be found in the literature (Ryser, 1999 – Ryser 2000 
– Lalioti, 1995), where scenarios have been used for 
the validation of requirements.  
We have decided to choose a scenario-based 
approach because scenarios can be easily integrated 
within development methodologies and can be 
adapted to the methodology’s notation and concepts. 
This is due to the fact that scenarios can be 
represented in various ways (Ryser, 2000). In this 
research, a scenario, called Security Attack Scenario, 
is represented as an enhanced Tropos diagram, 
which aims to analyse how the system copes in 
different kinds of security attacks.  
Therefore a scenario should include enough 
information about the system and its environment to 
allow validation of the system’s security 
requirements with respect to particular attacks. As 
such, we define  a Security Attack Scenario as an 
attack situation describing the actors of a software 
system and their secure capabilities as well as 
possible attackers and their goals, and it identifies 
how the secure capabilities of the system’s actors 
prevent (if they prevent) the satisfaction of the 
attackers’ goals.   
The presented approach aims to identify the goals 
and the intentions of possible attackers, identify 
through these a set of possible attacks to the system 
(test cases), and apply these attacks to the system to 
see how it copes.  By analysing the goals and the 
intentions of the attackers the developer obtains 
valuable information that helps to understand not 
only the how the attacker might attack the system, 
but also the why an attacker wants to attack the 
system. This leads to a better understanding of how 
possible attacks can be prevented. In addition, the 
application of a set of identified attacks to the 
system contributes towards the identification of 
attacks that the system might not be able to cope 
(failed test cases) and this leads to the re-definition 
of the actors of the system and the addition of new 
secure capabilities to enable them to protect against 
those attacks. 
A Security Attack Scenario involves a possible 
attacker, possible attack(s), the resources that are 
attacked, and the actors of the system related to the 
attack together with their secure capabilities.  
 An attacker is depicted as an actor who aims to 
break the security of the system. The attacker 
intentions are modelled as goals and tasks and their 
analysis follows the same reasoning techniques that 
the Tropos methodology employs for goal and task 
analysis. Attacks are depicted as dash-lined links 
(called attack links) that contain an “attacks” tag, 
starting from one of the attackers goals and ending 
to the attacked resource.  
For the purpose of a Security Attack Scenario, a 
differentiation takes place between internal and 
external actors of the system. Internal actors 
represent the core actors of the system whereas 
external actors represent actors that interact with the 
system. Such a differentiation is essential since it 
allows developers to identify different attacks to 
resources of the system that are exchanged between 
external and internal actors of the system.    
The process is divided into three main stages: 
creation of a scenario, validation of the scenario, and 
testing and redefinition of the system according to 
the scenario. Even though the presented process is 
introduced as a sequence of stages, in reality is 
highly iterative and stages can be interchanged 
according to the perception of the developers.  The 
following three sub-sections describe each of those 
stages. 
3.1 Scenario Creation  
There are two basic steps in the creation of a 
scenario. The first step involves the identification of 
the attackers’ intentions and the possible attacks to 
the system and the second step involves 
identification of possible countermeasures of the 
system to the indicated attacks. 
3.1.1 Identify the intentions of a possible 
attacker 
During the first step, the intentions of an attacker 
are analysed in terms of goals and tasks. Some of 
these goals can be identified by the threats modelled 
on the security reference diagram. For example, a 
possible threat to a system could be the application 
of cryptographic attacks, i.e. attacks aiming to 
modify the content of messages transmitted across 
the network. Such a threat could introduce the goal 
“perform cryptographic attacks” to a potential 
attacker. However, other goals (apart from the ones 
introduced by the threats identified in the security 
reference diagram) could be derived from the 
analysis of a possible attacker’s intentions. This is 
due to the fact that an attack is an exploitation of a 
system’s vulnerability, whereas a threat is a 
circumstance that has the potential to cause loss or 
harm (Schneier, 2000). Therefore, an attack can lead 
to a threat only if the exploitation of the 
vulnerability leads to a threat. This means that some 
attacks can be successful but do not lead to threats as 
other system features protect the system.   
When the analysis of the attacker’s intentions has 
been completed, possible attacks to the resources of 
the system are indicated using attack links. 
 3.1.2 Identify possible countermeasures 
The next step in the creation of a security attack 
scenario involves the identification of the actors of 
the system that posses capabilities to prevent the 
identified, from the previous step, attacks.   
Secure capabilities can prevent attacks in the 
information system in the sense that an actor with 
such capabilities can react to the attacks. 
Therefore, the actors (internal and external) of the 
system related to the identified attack(s) are 
modelled. The secure capabilities, of each actor, that 
help to prevent the identified attacks are identified 
and dashed-links (with the tag “help”) are provided 
indicating the capability and the attack they help to 
prevent. As an example, consider an internal actor 
that depends on an external actor to obtain some 
private information. An attacker aims to read the 
transmitted data (eavesdropping).  However, the 
external and the internal actors could have been 
assigned with secure capabilities to encrypt any data 
transmitted between them. As a result, 
eavesdropping becomes very difficult, since the data 
is transmitted across the network only encrypted.   
3.2 Scenario Validation 
When the scenarios have been created, they must 
be validated. Therefore, the next stage of the process 
involves the validation of the scenario. Software 
inspections are proved as effective means for 
document-based validation (Kosters, 2001) and as 
such are the choice of this research for the validation 
of the security attack scenarios. The inspection of 
the scenarios involves the identification of any 
possible violations of the Tropos syntax and of any 
possible inconsistency between the scenarios and the 
models of the previous stages. Such an inspection 
involves the use of validation checklists. Consider, 
for instance, the following checklist. 
1. Is a name defined for each scenario? 
2. Are actors represented using the correct 
notation?  
3. Are attack links and help links correctly 
denoted? 
4. Do the attack scenarios capture all possible 
attacks? 
5. Do different scenarios exist for the same kind 
of attacks? 
6. Are there any missing parts on the identified 
scenarios? (Any links missing or any actors 
missing?) 
7. Are there any secure capabilities identified in 
the previous stages not present in the scenarios? 
8. Are there any actors, identified in the previous 
stages, related to the attacks not present in the 
scenarios? 
9. Are there any threats identified on the security 
reference diagram not present on the scenarios? 
10. Are all the resources that can be attacked 
present in the scenarios? 
11. Are the non-prevented attacks correctly 
marked? 
It must be noticed that although inspections have 
been proposed by this research for the validation of 
the security attack scenarios, different techniques 
could be applied depending on the developers and 
the nature of the system. As an example, validation 
techniques to requirements specification are (apart 
from inspections) walkthroughs and prototyping 
(Kosters, 2001). 
When the scenarios have been validated, the next 
step aims to identify test cases and test, using those 
test cases, the security of the system against the 
potential attacks. Each test case is derived from a 
possible attack depicted in the security attack 
scenarios. For each test case a precondition is 
necessary (the state of the system before the attack), 
an expected system reaction (how the system reacts 
in the attack), and also a discussion that forms the 
basis for the decision regarding the test case.  
The test cases are applied and a decision is 
formed to whether the system can prevent the 
identified attacks or not. The decision whether an 
attack can be prevented (and in what degree) or not 
lies on the developer. However as an indication of 
the decision it must be taken into consideration that 
at least one secure capability must help an attack, in 
order for the developer to decide the attack can be 
prevented. Attacks that cannot be prevented are 
notated as solid attack links (as opposed to dashed 
attack links).  
For each attack that it has been decided it cannot 
be prevented, extra capabilities must be assigned to 
the system to help towards the prevention of that 
attack. In general, the assignment of extra secure 
capabilities is not a unique process and depends on 
the perception of the developer regarding the attack 
dangers. However, a good approach could be to 
analyse the capabilities of the attacker used to 
perform the attack and assign the system with 
capabilities that can revoke the attacker’s 
capabilities. 
4. AN EXAMPLE 
To illustrate our approach we apply it to a case 
study from the medical area. This case study is part 
of a real-life system, called the electronic Single 
 Assessment Process (eSAP), under development at 
the University of Sheffield (Mouratidis, 2003c). The 
electronic Single Assessment Process (eSAP) system 
is a health and social care information system for the 
effective care of older people. To make this example 
simpler and more understandable, we consider a 
substantial part of the eSAP system.   
The application of the Security Attack Scenarios 
to the eSAP aims to analyse the security of the 
system by considering the intentions of possible 
attackers and the secure capabilities that have been 
assigned to the actors of the system and provide 
recommendations to improve the system’s security.  
As derived from the analysis of the eSAP system 
(Mouratidis, 2003d), the three main security features 
are privacy, integrity and availability. According to 
Stallings (Stallings, 1999), the following categories 
of attacks can be identified that can put in danger the 
above security features. 
Interception, in which an unauthorised party, 
such as a person, a program or a computer, gains 
access to an asset. This is an attack on privacy.  
Modification, in which an unauthorised party not 
only gains party to but also tampers with an asset. 
This is an attack on integrity.  
Interruption, in which an asset of the system is 
destroyed or becomes unavailable or unusable. This 
is an attack on availability. 
Due to lack of space in this paper we present only 














Let us first consider an interception attack 
scenario in which a possible attacker wishes to 
attack the privacy of the system, in other words to 
obtain information such as assessment information 
or a care plan.  As identified in the analysis of the 
eSAP system, social engineering, password sniffing 
and eavesdropping are the main threats to the 
privacy of the system. 
Therefore, the attacker’s main goal can be 
decomposed to Read Data and Get Access to the 
System sub-goals as shown in Figure 1. The first 
sub-goal involves the attacker trying to read the data 
that it is transmitted to and from the eSAP system, 
whereas the second sub-goal involves the attacker 
trying to break into the system and gain access to it. 
To accomplish the first sub-goal the Attacker 
should try to read the data transferred between the 
Social Worker and the eSAP system’s actors such as 
the Assessment Evaluator and the Authenticator. 
To accomplish the second sub-goal, the Attacker 
might use password sniffing or social engineering. 
In the first case, the Attacker scans all the 
resources that flow in the network looking for 
passwords whereas in the case of social engineering, 
the Attacker tries to deceive the Social Worker in 
order to obtain valuable information, such as their 
authorisation details that will allow them to gain 
access to the system. Therefore, for the presented 
attack scenario the reaction of the system should be 
tested (amongst other) against three test cases, read 




















Figure 1: Interception attacks scenario 
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Test Case 1: read data 
Precondition: The Social Worker actor tries to 
obtain an assessment evaluation. The Attacker tries 
to read the transmitted data.  
System expected security reaction: The 
system should prevent Attacker from reading any 
important information. 
Discussion: The Attacker will try to read the 
data from any resource transmitted between the 
external actors and the eSAP system. However, 
curerntly the system and its external actors have 
capabilities to encrypt and decrypt data. As a result 
all the important data is transmitted across the 
network encrypted and therefore it is difficult for 
the Attacker to read it. However, the Attacker 
might try to obtain (or sometimes even guess) the 
encryption key.    
Test Case Result: The system is protected 
against read data attacks. However, a 
recommendation would be for the system to 
change the cryptographic algorithm often. 
Test Case 2: Password sniffing 
Precondition: The Social Worker tries to 
obtain access to the eSAP system by providing 
their authorisation details. The Attacker tries to 
intercept the authorisation details. 
System expected security reaction: prevent 
attacker from obtaining users’ passwords 
Discussion: the main target of the Attacker 
would be all the resource transmitions between the 
Social Worker and the eSAP system. Currently the 
system does not have any kind of protection in this 
kind of attack. A good technique to defend against 
password sniffing is to use one-time-passwords. A 
one-time-password is a password tha is valid for 
only one use. After this use, it is not longer valid, 
and so even if the  
Attacker obtains such a password it is useless.  
However, the users must be able to gain access to 
the system more than once. This can be 
accomplished with, what is commonly  known as, 
a password list. Each time a user tries to access the 
system they provide a different password from a 
list of passwords.  
Test Case Result: Currently the system fails to 
protect against password sniffing attacks. For the 
eSAP system to be able to react in a password 
sniffing attack, the external actors of the system 
(such as the Nurse, the Social Worker, the Older 
Person) must be provided with capabilities to 
provide passwords from a password list.  
Test Case 3: Social engineering 
Precondition: The Attacker tries to obtain 
system information directly from the Social 
Worker. 
System expected security reaction: help 
towards the prevention of social engineering  
Discussion: The Attacker will try to deceive 
any external actors (such as the Social Worker in 
the presented scenario) into giving any 
confidential, private or privileged information. It is 
worth mentioning that the Attacker will not 
directly ask for this information but they will try to 
gain the trust of the actors and then exploit this 
trust.  
Test Case Result: Currently the system helps 
towards the prevention of social engineering by 
requesting consent for any information to be 
shared. However, this alone does not guarantee the 
successful prevention against social engineering. A 
primary defence measurement against software 
engineering is security awareness training. Good 
resistance training will help to prevent actors from 
being persuaded to give information away. 
As mentioned above, interruption attacks 
mainly aim the availability of the system. From an 
Attacker’s point of view, such attacks can be 
mainly categorised into two main categories, 
physical attacks and electronic attacks (Figure 2). 
Physical attacks include any attacks to the 
infrastructure of the system, whereas electronic 
attacks involve attacks such as denial of service 
attacks. 
Therefore, the Attacker’s main goal (attack 
eSAP availability) can be decomposed to physical 
and electronic attacks.  
Physical attacks involve the cutting of a 
communication line, or the destruction of a part of 
the system. 
On the other hand, one of the most popular 
electronic attacks to the availability of a system is 
denial of service attacks. Since physical attacks to 
the eSAP system are outside the focus of this 
research project, only a test case involving a denial 
of service attack is considered. 
Test Case: denial of service 
Precondition: The Attacker tries to make the 
eSAP system unavailable by performing a denial 
of service attack. 
System expected security reaction: the eSAP 
should be able to detect the attack and recover. 
Discussion: During a denial of service attack, 
the Attacker tries to prevent the normal operation 
of the communication facilities of the system. 
Since a denial of service attack is an active attack, 
the main goal of the eSAP system is to detect the 
attack and recover from any disruption it may 
cause as fast as possible. Towards this direction, 
the actors of the system must have capabilities to 
operate even if some other actors have become 
unavailable. Mostly, denial of service attacks  
 Figure 2: Interruption attacks scenario 
 
require from Attackers to steal an administration 
account of a hose computer in the network. 
Therefore, an efficient way to prevent such attacks 
is to secure the system. In addition, the Attacker 
might make use of spoofed source address. To stop 
this, the system must perform filtering mainly 
when internal actors communicate with external 
ones.  
Test Case Results: The eSAP system provides 
authorisation mechanisms and therefore helps 
towards the effective security of the system and in 
turn the prevention of denial of service attacks. 
However, filtering is required to make the 
protection against denial of service attacks even 
better. Therefore, an actor should be introduced to 
the system that will perform such filtering. 
4.1 Discussion on the use of 
scenarios in the eSAP system 
In order to test the security of the system, two 
different kinds of scenarios were identified 
involving four different test cases. By applying 
these test cases many useful results were obtained 
about the security of the eSAP system. First of all, 
it was identified that the system provides enough 
protection against some of these attacks. Secondly, 
for the attacks that the system did not provided 
adequately protection, extra actors and extra secure 
capabilities were identified and the following 
modifications (amongst other) took place in the 
eSAP system. 
Capabilities were given to the external actors 
as well to the Cryptography Manager to enable 
them to change the cryptographic algorithm often. 
The lack of such capabilities was identified during 
the read data test case of the interception attack 
scenario. 
The external actors of the system were given 
the capability to provide passwords from a 
password list, and the Authenticator was given 
capabilities to successfully process such 
passwords. The lack of such capabilities was 
identified by the application of the password-
sniffing test case of the interception attack 
scenario. 
An actor was introduced to the system to filter 
the eSAP in order to help towards the protection of 
denial of service attacks. The lack of such an actor 
was identified by the application of the denial of 
service test case of the interruption security attack 
scenario. 
5. RELATED WORK 
Scenarios have been used in many areas of 
software engineering, from requirements 
modelling (Potts, 1994) to requirements validation 
(Ryser, 2000).   
Our idea of analysing the intentions of possible 
attackers is similar to the one presented by Liu et 
al (Liu, 2002). However, the way that our 
scenarios are created, verified and applied is totally 
different.  
Yu’s work is basically used to identify security 
requirements; the Security Attack Scenarios in our 
work are used to test the security requirements of 
the system identified in the previous development 
stages. So a very similar idea is applied in a 
different stage of the development lifecycle. 
Yu argues that when the intentions of the 
attackers are identified we can equip the system 
with countermeasures, however it is never 
mentioned how we can do this neither provides a 
kind of process for providing such 
countermeasures.  
Moreover, in our approach we consider test 
cases, in other words we provide ways to test each 
scenario for specific test cases, reason about the 
reaction of the system and take a final decision if 
the system can react to the specific attack. In cases 
that the system cannot react to the attack, possible 
countermeasures are discussed and secure 
capabilities are introduced to the actors of the 
system to satisfy them. 
Yu’s analysis takes place in a higher level than 
the one proposed by us. Yu proposes the analysis 
to take place during the early requirements. This 
could be a bit superficial for security since 
modelling security requirements as softgoals does 
not adequately model security (Mouratidis, 2002). 
In our case, we know the secure capabilities of the 
 actors of the system (and therefore we have a more 
precise idea of what security measurements our 
system has) and we can reason about the security 
attacks according to those capabilities. 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
WORK  
In this paper we have presented results from the 
development of a scenario-based approach to test 
how a software system under development copes 
against potential security attacks.  
The introduction of security attack scenarios to 
test the system’s response to potential attacks 
provides developers the ability to realistically 
check how the developed system will react to 
possible security attacks. This, in turn, allows 
developers to re-consider particular system 
functions with respect to security until the system 
under development satisfies all the security 
requirements. 
The presented work is part of our efforts aiming 
to extend the Tropos methodology in a degree that 
will allow developers to successfully consider 
security issues during the whole development 
lifecycle of an information system.  
Therefore, future work includes the full 
integration of the presented technique within the 
security oriented process of the Tropos 
methodology, and its application to more case 
studies in order to further assess its validity.    
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